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Abstract. Evidence on a causal link between family size and children’s education, as in the trade-
off suggested by Gary S. Becker between child quantity and quality, is still inconclusive. Recent
empirical studies have focused heavily on China, exploiting for identification the country’s One-
Child Policy (OCP) as an exogenous source of variation in the number of offspring. This literature,
however, suffers from measurement error in the key policy variable (individual OCP coverage)
and the use of inadequate measures of child quality outcomes (educational attainment). Using a
novel and more accurate taxonomy of provincial OCP regulations and studying exclusively post-
compulsory schooling outcomes of children that are subject to parental discretion, we find evidence
for a sizeable child quantity-quality trade-off in China. Various robustness checks corroborate this
conclusion.
Keywords: Family Size, Education, One-Child Policy, Quantity-Quality Trade-Off.
JEL Classification: J13, J18, I2.
Acknowledgement: This paper has benefited from comments by Michael Kvasnicka, Thomas
Siedler, Miriam Beblo, participants of the Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society in Kyoto,
the China Meeting of the Econometric Society in Chengdu, the Annual Conference of the Verein
fu¨r Sociapolitik (German Economic Association) in Mu¨nster, and participants of seminars at RWI
- Leibniz Institute for Economic Research, Universita¨t Hamburg, Otto-von-Guericke-Universita¨t
Magdeburg and the Berlin Network of Labor Market Research (BeNA). All remaining errors are
my own.
1 Introduction
The quantity and quality of children is of paramount importance for the operation and performance
of economies. Determining the volume and quality of labor supplied on factor markets, population
growth and human capital formation are key drivers of economic growth and of pivotal relevance
for the financing of public pension systems. The quantity and quality of offspring also affect
the inter-generational transmission of wealth, income and education, and mould the functioning of
marriage markets. In light of their paramount importance, it is little surprising that social scientists
have shown great interest in the determinants of child quantity and quality and the relationship
between the two. This long-standing interest has received further stimulus by Gary S. Becker’s
(1960) quantity-quality model of fertility, which identified a potential trade-off between quantity
and quality, arising from a non-linear household budget constraint that causes the marginal cost of
child quality to increase in child quantity (and vice versa) (Becker, 1960; Becker and Lewis, 1973).1
Testing empirically for the existence and size of a causal link between family size and children’s
quality is difficult. The reason is that both child quantity (number of children) and child quality
(e.g. educational choices) are subject to parental discretion and thus endogenous and possibly also
chosen simultaneously. Empirical studies on the link between family size and children’s quality
have addressed this identification problem by making use of exogenous variation in child quantity
provided by twin births (Angrist et al., 2010; Black et al., 2005; Li et al., 2008), the gender of
newborns (Lee, 2008), the height of children (Lee, 2012), and birth control policies (Qian, 2009; Liu,
2014; Li and Zhang, 2017). The evidence produced, however, is mixed. Some studies find a negative
effect of child quantity on quality, while others find no effect or even a positive effect. In part, this
inconclusive evidence may be explained by a focus on developed rather than developing countries.
In developed countries, which exhibit more generous welfare systems, any quantity-quality trade-off
should be less strong, if not entirely absent (Li et al., 2008). But even for developing countries
such as China, which has received growing attention in recent years and arguably provides a more
adequate testing ground, the evidence remains mixed. This recent strand of studies for China,
however, suffers from a number of methodological shortcomings that cast doubt on the validity
and robustness of this literature’s findings. Exploiting for identification China’s One-Child Policy
(OCP), the most influential population policy in world history, as an exogenous source of variation
in household size, studies in this recent branch of literature suffer from severe measurement error in
their key policy variable (individual OCP coverage) and in part also in their child quality outcome
considered (educational attainment).
In this paper, we address these shortcomings in the literature and re-examine the relationship
between family size and child quality for China. Using household data from the 2000 Chinese census
and exploiting for identification variation across time and regions in individual OCP coverage, we
produce new evidence based on instrumental variable (IV) regressions on the effect of child quantity
1Becker’s quantity-quality model provides a potential explanation for why economies which experienced steady
income growth have witnessed both falling fertility rates and rising education levels, a phenomenon at odds with
standard Malthusian predictions that growth of production should stimulate population growth (Malthus, 1798).
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on the educational attainment of children of post-compulsory schooling age. We restrict the analysis
to households with mothers who are Han, i.e. members of the largest ethnic group in China, and
who have an agricultural Hukou, as individuals with an agricultural background provide a more
adequate testing ground for the same reasons that also justify a focus on developing rather than
developed countries. Our results show that exogenous reductions in child quantity induced by
the fertility restrictions of the OCP substantially increased the educational attainment of children.
Various robustness checks corroborate this finding.
Our paper contributes to the empirical literature on the link between family size and children’s
quality in several ways. First, by providing new evidence on the link between family size and
children’s education for China, we add to and complement the growing body of empirical literature
that focuses on this country. Second, and of importance from a methodological perspective, we
introduce a new and continuous instrumental variable for individual OCP coverage, which measures
more accurately than hitherto the case in the literature the actual degree to which women were
subjected to OCP fertility restrictions during their years of prime fertility. We construct this
instrumental variable from detailed information that we compiled and processed from regional
family planning regulations in China’s thirty-one provinces and changes in these regulations over
time, as well as from information on women’s prime fertility age, their ethnicity, and their economic
background. This new measure of OCP coverage can in the future be fruitfully employed also in
other applications, such as the study of tilted sex ratios at birth and their effects on marriage market
outcomes or criminal activity. As data availability may be more limited in other applications, we
also gauge in additional explorations, and as a point of reference and service to other researchers, the
relative importance of ethnic background information or household Hukou for obtaining a measure
of OCP coverage that is highly correlated with the measure of OCP coverage which makes full use of
all relevant information. Finally, we use enrollment (current or past) in post-compulsory education
as a measure of child quality, an outcome that is more clearly subject to parental discretion than
general school enrollment which has been used in parts of the literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed account of the OCP in China
and reviews the relevant empirical literature on the link between family size and children’s quality.
Section 3 describes the data and our identification strategy. Section 4 presents the regression
results and discusses various robustness checks. Finally, section 5 summarizes our core findings and
concludes.
2 Background
2.1 One-Child Policy (OCP)
The One-Child Policy (OCP) was introduced by the Chinese central government as a means to
curb rapid population growth, a step deemed necessary to avoid shortages in the supply of food
and housing and aid the country in its transition to a modern economy. The OCP did not mark
the beginning of centralized family planning and birth control efforts in China. In fact, first steps
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in this direction date back to the 1950s.2 The year 1979, however, marks a historic watershed in
Chinese family planning policy. In that year, several provinces (but not all) introduced in their
territory what came to be known as the One-Child Policy (OCP), among them Beijing, Tianjin,
Shanghai and Jiangsu. Prior to that date, public policies had merely advocated the virtues of low
fertility and encouraged birth control. Now, governments in these provinces explicitly prescribed
low fertility targets for couples and enforced these targets with the help of severe financial fines in
case they were breached.3
Although formally announced in 1979 and meant to apply for the whole country, the OCP
was therefore de facto implemented only piecemeal and at first only in selected Chinese provinces.
The OCP was also not uniform in the fertility restrictions it imposed across couples of different
ethnic and economic background. Exemptions for minorities, those with an agricultural background
(agricultural hukou4), and parents with both an agricultural background and a first-born girl were
introduced in many provinces in the 1980s and 1990s, albeit at different times.5 Furthermore,
in the 1990s, the first children of families that had already been covered by the OCP became of
marriageable and fertile age. Most provinces permitted couples to have a second child if both
spouses had been born as a single child to their parents. Further exemptions were introduced in
late 2013, and again only in some provinces, that a second child was permissible if at least one
spouse had been a single child. In 2016, the OCP was officially terminated by allowing all couples,
irrespective of their ethnic, economic and regional background, to henceforth have two children.6
The afore-sketched history of the OCP, its implementation and evolution, makes clear that,
during the course of its term, the OCP was not homogenous across provinces, couples, and time,
but rather a changing complex conglomerate of time-variant and province-specific regulations and
exemptions that in practice entailed great diversity both in the degree of the policy’s coverage and
in its bite. The empirical literature on the quantity-quality trade-off in China (Qian, 2009; Liu,
2014; Li and Zhang, 2017), and studies investigating other outcomes, such as sex ratio imbalances
(Bulte et al., 2011; Li et al., 2011), which exploit the OCP for identification, generally fail to take
into account this heterogeneity of the OCP. In the next section, we will discuss this shortcoming in
2The document “Instructions on Population Control” (guan yu kong zhi ren kou wen ti de zhi shi) from 1955
stated that the Communist Party was supportive of family planning as a means to facilitate population health and
economic prosperity. On March 5th, 1978, the National People’s Congress adopted Article 53 of the “Constitution
of the People’s Republic of China” which stated that the country advocates and promotes family planning, marking
the first incident that family planning was officially enshrined in the fundamental law of the country (Yang, 2004).
3See Scharping (2003) and Ebenstein (2010) for information on monetary punishments for such excess fertility as
envisaged in provincial family planning regulations.
4The hukou system is a household registration system in force since the 1950s. Under this system, everybody
is registered and given a hukou certificate. The household booklet (hu kou bu) contains, amongst other things,
information on the ethnic and economic background of each family member. See, for example, Cheng and Selden
(1994) for further details on the hukou system.
5The 7th document, also named “Report on the Family Planning Work” (guan yu ji hua sheng yu gong zuo
qing kuang de hui bao), was issued in 1984 and explicated that a second birth was only allowed with permission in
rural areas and otherwise prohibited, and that appropriate birth control regulations should be implemented among
minorities.
6On December 27, 2015, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passed the amendment of the
Population and Family Planning Law that a 2-child policy is to be implemented from January 1, 2016.
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detail, review the existing literature on the link between family size and child quality and discuss
mismeasurement in OCP regulations and individual OCP coverage in studies that investigate other
outcomes than child quality for China.
2.2 Previous Literature
Existing studies on the causal effect of child quantity on quality employ a variety of identification
strategies and consider different countries. One source of exogenous variation in child quantity
exploited in the literature is the gender of first-borns (Lee, 2008) or the sex composition of siblings
(Conley and Glauber, 2006; Angrist et al., 2010). In societies that exhibit a preference for sons,
families with a first-born girl tend more towards having a second child; and among parents with a
preference for gender heterogeneity among their offspring, those with two children that are of the
same sex are more likely to seek a third child. Using the gender of the first child as an instrument
for child quantity in 2SLS regressions, Lee (2008) studies parental investment in child education
in South Korea. Lee finds evidence for a trade-off between the quantity and quality of children, a
trade-off that becomes more pronounced as a family’s sibling size increases. Exploiting variation in
the sex composition of the first two children, and using 1990 U.S. Census data, Conley and Glauber
(2006) find that sibling size has a negative effect on the likelihood of attending a private school and
a positive effect on the grade retention for second-born boys. Using the same instrument, but data
from the 20% microdata samples from the 1995 and 1983 Israeli censuses, Angrist et al. (2010) in
contrast find no evidence for a quantity-quality trade-off in Israel. The use of information on the
gender of children for identification in these studies, however, is not unproblematic, as the spread
of ultrasound technology in the 1980s has made prenatal identification and selection of the sex of
fetuses viable. This potential endogeneity of a child’s gender casts doubt on the validity of this IV
(Li et al., 2008).
A second, also prominent, and early source of exogenous variation in child quantity used in the
literature are twin births. Exploiting twin births for identification, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980)
study the effect of family size (number of offspring) on the educational attainment of children
in India. Consistent with the quantity-quality trade-off, the authors find a larger family size
to adversely affect the average educational attainment of children. Li et al. (2008) also find a
negative effect of family size, identified by a twin birth, on the educational attainment of children
in China. The same holds true for Glick et al. (2007), who, using data from the Romania Integrated
Household Survey, show that unplanned fertility (through a twin birth) has a negative impact on
children’s nutrition and schooling. Similarly, Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009), using data from the
Chinese Child Twins Survey, find a negative effect of an increase in family size trough a twin
birth at child parity one or two on the school performance and self-assessed health of children.
Using data for Norway and employing standard OLS regression analysis, Black et al. (2005) also
find an additional child to reduce the average educational attainment of children in a household.
However, they produce evidence which shows that this effect becomes significantly smaller, once
family background characteristics are controlled for, and that it disappears altogether when birth
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order is accounted for in the analysis. Furthermore, using twin births as an IV in 2SLS regressions,
Black et al. (2005) find family size to have only negligible effects on the quality of children.
For several reasons, however, the use of twin births as an instrument (like the afore-discussed
gender of a child) is not unproblematic. First, as noted in Black et al. (2005), their use tends to
bias 2SLS towards producing evidence in support of a trade-off between quantity and quality of
offspring. Since the spacing between twin births is zero, parents may shift more resources towards
non-twin children which causes bias in estimates of the quantity-quality trade-off (Rosenzweig and
Zhang, 2009). Second, the birth weight of twins is lower than that of non-twins, which can also
directly affect the outcome of children. Finally, with the onset and spread of assisted reproductive
technology that carries the risk of elevated twinning rates, a twin birth no longer needs to constitute
an exogenous event beyond the control of parents, but becomes potentially subject to endogenous
parental choices and hence self-selection of parents.
A third, and more recent source of exogenous variation in child quantity exploited in the liter-
ature is public policy, in particular the One-Child Policy (OCP) in China which limited (albeit at
different times in different regions and for different groups) the maximum number of children that
households could have to one. Focusing only on rural China and using a 1% sample of the Chinese
1990 census and county-level data from the 1989 China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), Qian
(2009) exploits as an instrument for family size the regional variation in the exemption of parents
from the OCP when they have a first-born girl to study the effect of sibling numbers on the school
enrollment of first-born children. Qian finds no evidence for a negative effect of child quantity on
quality. The study, however, uses county-level OCP exemption information only from 1989, and
ignores possible other exemptions, both concurrent and prior to 1989, that could impact the fertility
behavior of women over the course of their fertile age. Moreover, a number of children considered
in the analysis of Qian (2009) are still in compulsory education and of compulsory schooling age,
where parental discretion in schooling choices is limited, if not completely lacking. Liu (2014), in
turn, mainly uses data from the 1993 CHNS and exploits exemptions from the OCP as well as
regional variations in the level of fines imposed for unsanctioned births as an IV. The findings of
this study suggest a significant negative effect of number of siblings on child quality, as measured
by a height-for-age z-score. However, OCP exemption status and fines are sampled only for three
years, 1989, 1991 and 1993, again ignoring earlier potential exemptions (or restrictions) affecting
female fertility over the course of women’s fertile age. Finally, Li and Zhang (2017), exploiting
regional differences in OCP enforcement intensity as an instrument for family size and using data
from the Chinese censuses of 1982 and 1990, find a negative effect of family size on the educational
attainment of first-born Han children. Their variable of policy enforcement intensity, measured by
an excess fertility rate, is defined as the percentage of all Han mothers aged 25-44 with at least one
surviving child who gave a higher order birth (2nd or higher) in 1981. This definition of Li and
Zhang (2017), and hence their underlying identification strategy, is therefore not based on actual
policy regulations, their measurement and quantification, but on the factual realization of births,
which is highly problematic, as realized births are subject also to parental discretion and hence the
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influence of parental preferences.
Apart from the afore-mentioned studies by Qian (2009), Liu (2014), Li and Zhang (2017), the
OCP has been used also as an exogenous source of variation in studies investigating outcomes other
than the quantity-quality trade-off. Bulte et al. (2011), for instance, examine the role of the OCP
for the extremely male-biased gender ratio in China, a country with strong son preferences. In their
analysis, they use only the birth year of a child to identify children born to parents covered by OCP
regulations. The exclusive distinction between children born before/in or after 1979 is a very rough
measure of parental exposure to OCP regulations that ignores entirely the variation across provinces
in the introduction of the OCP. Since they only assume that ethnic minorities are exempt from
the OCP throughout all provinces in China after 1979, the various exemptions granted to specific
ethnic and economic groups across provinces and across time are also ignored (we discuss provincial
family planning regulations in detail in Section 3.1). A quite similar dichotomous measure, but also
far from perfect, is used by Li et al. (2011) in their difference-in-differences based analysis of the
effect that the OCP had on the sex ratio at birth in China. They define a child to be born under
OCP regulations if the child is of Han ethnicity and born after 1979. As discussed above, ethnic
minorities, however, were not always exempted from the OCP, nor were Han always restricted by
the OCP. Furthermore, only few provinces actually implemented the OCP already in 1979. Overly
simplistic classifications, as the ones employed in these studies, entail sizeable measurement error
in the actual OCP coverage of individuals which can significantly bias estimates.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
In the empirical analyses, we make use of two types of data. The first is self-compiled and sum-
marizes in detail and for the first time the introduction and evolution of the OCP and its various
exemptions across provinces and time. The second contains household information from the 5th
Chinese Census in 2000. We use information from both data sources to construct our key policy
variable, i.e. the extent of exposure of women during their fertile years to OCP fertility restrictions.
From the second data source, we also obtain information on the number of siblings in a household
(our child quantity measure) and the educational attainment of children (the basis of our child
quality measure), in addition to more general household background information.
In the following, we first describe in detail both data sources and the construction of our key
variables (Sections 3.1 and 3.2). After that, in Section 3.3, we document the importance of various
household background information for constructing a variable that fully captures the complex time-
variant and province-specific body of OCP regulations and exemptions that potentially restrict the
fertility choices of a household. The objective of this exercise is to identify factors that are of prime
importance for correctly quantifying the intensity of OCP treatment of households, and thereby
provide a point of reference and service to other researchers who may have less than the full universe
of information at their disposal (depending on the specific application and data accessibility) that
is necessary to construct an encompassing policy variable for the OCP coverage of households. In
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Section 3.3 we furthermore provide summary statistics for our final estimation sample. Finally, in
Section 3.4, we present and discuss our empirical strategy.
3.1 OCP Regulations and Exemptions
A concise single-document summary of the OCP with all of its regulations and exemptions does
not exist. We therefore had to construct such a detailed summary ourselves drawing on numerous
publications and directives that describe the different family planning regulations enforced over time
in China’s provinces.7 The result of this comprehensive policy review is tabulated in Table 1 below.
From its earliest inception in 1979 and through to the year 2000, Table 1 provides information for
each province (column 1) on the year the OCP has been first implemented (column 2) and any
periods of years in which certain types of households have been exempted from the obligation to
bear at most one child (columns (3)-(6)). These households fall into four types. First, households in
which both spouses have an ethnic minority background (column 3). Second, households in which
at least one spouse has an ethnic minority background (column 4). Third, households in which both
spouses have an agricultural Hukou8 (column 5). And finally, households in which both spouses
have an agricultural Hukou and also a first-born girl (column 6).9 The last exemption is sometimes
referred to as the 1.5-child policy (Ebenstein, 2010; Yang, 2012). Altogether, we consider thirty-one
provinces.10
As can be seen from Table 1, there is great variation across provinces and across time within
provinces in OCP exemptions granted to specific types of households. There is also great hetero-
geneity across provinces in the year they first implemented OCP fertility restrictions. The OCP
did not start in 1979 in all of China, as assumed in parts of the literature and used therein as
a cut off date to define OCP treatment in the empirical analysis (see discussion below). In fact,
only a minority of provinces implemented the OCP already in 1979. Moreover, after 1979, some
provinces were newly formed, or dissolved and integrated into other provinces, so residents of these
provinces were covered by different OCP regulations before and after such administrative territorial
7The different sources we used for this purpose are listed in Table A-1 in the appendix.
8Hukou provides information on household type. There were two types of Hukou until 2000, an agricultural
Hukou for people who have an agricultural background, and a non-agricultural Hukou for people who don’t have an
agricultural background.
9Note that in Table 1 we disregard two exemptions that are immaterial for our analysis. The first is the exemption
of spouses from OCP coverage who have parents that had already been subject to OCP regulations. The second is
the exemption of parents who have a first-born child with a non-genetic disease. Note also that we recorded Tibet
in Table 1 as a province with no OCP regulations in the period under investigation. The reason is that the OCP in
Tibet covered only Han cadres who account for a very small fraction of the total population in Tibet.
10Hong Kong and Macau, both returned to China in the 1990s, have never implemented the OCP. The same holds
true for Taiwan, which China still considers an integral part of the People’s Republic of China.
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Table 1: Introductions of OCP and Exemptions across Provinces and Time
Province: OCP Exemptions if:
from: both spouses one spouse both spouses both spouses
minority minority agricultural agricultural
with a girl
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Beijing 1979
Tianjin 1979
Hebei 1982 1984–1994 1989–
1995a –
Shanxi 1982 1982– 1990–
Inner Mongolia 1982 1982–1995 1988–
1996a –
Liaoning 1980 1982-1984 1985c – 1985–
1985b–
Jilin 1984 1994a – 1985–1993
Heilongjiang 1979 1981–1993 1990–
1994a –
Shanghai 1979
Jiangsu 1979
Zhejiang 1982 1990d– 1982–1989
Anhui 1981 1981– 1988–
Fujian 1982 1984–1991d
1992e –
Jiangxi 1981 1990– 1985–
Shandong 1980 1984– 1986–
Henan 1981 1990f – 1990–
Hubei 1981 1988–
Hunan 1982 1990g – 1990h– 1987–
Guangdong 1980 1980–1997 1986–1997 1998–
1998f –
Guangxi 1982 1989a – 1985-1988a 1989–
Hainan 1980 1980–1989 1990d– 1986–
Chongqing 1980
Sichuan 1980
Guizhou 1982 1982–1998 1982-1987 1998–
1988h–
Yunnan 1979 1979–
Tibet
Shaanxi 1981 1981– 1986–
Gansu 1982 1982–1989 1990–
1990f –
Qinghai 1982 1986f – 1986i –
Ningxia 1982 1982– 1982–
Xinjiang 1992 1992– 1992–
Notes: The table documents province-level OCP introduction years and exemptions. For
each province (column (1)), column (2) shows the year when the OCP was first introduced.
Columns (3) - (6) indicate any periods of exemptions from the OCP granted to four different
types of households. Some exemptions at province level were furthermore restricted to special
groups or governed by particular regulations: (a) only minorities with a total population
less than 10 million (Manchu and Zhuang have populations exceeding 10 millions); (b) female
spouse must be agricultural; (c) one spouse must belong to a minority, whose total population
is less than 10 million; (d) does not apply to the minority Zhuang; (e) both spouses must be
agricultural and not belong to the minority Zhuang; (f) both spouses must be agricultural; (g)
one spouse must be agricultural; (h) one spouse must belong to a minority; (i) both spouses
must be non-agricultural. The regulations used to construct this table are listed in Table A-1
in the appendix.
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restructuring.11
The complexity, time-varying nature, and great regional diversity of OCP regulations docu-
mented in Table 1 have been largely ignored in existing empirical work, or taken into account only
partially. For instance, Bulte et al. (2011) and Li et al. (2011) assume that the OCP took force
in 1979 throughout all of China and that it applied undifferentiated and with universal coverage
to all Han population. Clearly, neither was the case. They wrongly assume that exemptions from
the OCP existed in all provinces, i.e. throughout China, for all minorities in all years after 1979.
Moreover, it disregards other exemptions from OCP fertility restrictions that have been granted in
different provinces to different groups at different times. Qian (2009), who focuses only on first-
born children from rural areas in four out of the 30 provinces in China in 1990 (Liaoning, Jiangsu,
Shandong and Henan), also considers but a single type of exemption from OCP regulations, the
exemption for agricultural households with a first-born girl. Focusing on but one exemption again
fails to do justice to the restrictions households actually faced in their fertility behavior during their
fertile years. Liaoning province, for instance, had a very large minority population at the time,
parts of which were exempted from OCP regulations even when both spouses were not agricultural
or households did not have a first-born girl.12 Furthermore, in the study by Qian (2009), exemp-
tions for agricultural households with a first-born girl are recorded only in a single year immediately
prior to 1990, i.e. in the year 1989. Liu (2014), in turn, who also studies only a subset of Chinese
provinces, considers different types of exemptions, as well as fines for violations of OCP regulations,
to construct instrumental variables for the number of siblings in a household in 1993. In the study,
household fertility is assumed to be fully unrestricted by OCP regulations if the household could
enjoy an exemption in at least one year in 1989, 1991 or 1993. However, this narrow definition
ignores that households may have been subject to quite different OCP regulations before 1989,
governing part or most of their fertile years and hence reproductive behavior. Finally, the study by
Li and Zhang (2017) considers an excess fertility rate, which it defines as the share of Han moth-
ers of primary childbearing age who gave a higher-order birth in 1981. The assumption that all
higher-order births to Han mothers in 1981 were not permitted under the OCP, however, is wrong.
In Hunan province, for example, OCP regulations were implemented only in 1982, a year after the
stock-taking year chosen to define the excess fertility rate. As a consequence, all births in Hunan in
1981 that are defined as “excess births” in the analysis are effectively misclassified. Furthermore,
taking reference to but a single calendar year (1981) ignores the time-varying nature and great
regional diversity of OCP regulations and exemptions that in practice governed household fertility
(over its fertile life time) in China.
11Hainan province, for example, was created only in 1988 out of parts of Guangdong province. Residents of these
parts were hence subject to Guangdong family planning regulations before 1988, and to Hainan family planning
regulations thereafter. Chongqing, in turn, became again a province in 1997 after having been an integral part of
Sichuan province for more than forty years (1954-1996). Before 1997, but not thereafter, residents of Chongqing were
hence to observe Sichuan OCP regulations. Table 1 takes these changes into account by combining regulations for
residents in Hainan and Chongqing with the respective regulations that existed in Guangdong and Sichuan in earlier
years.
12In the 1990 Chinese Census, about 20% of the population in Liaoning province had minority status, a much
higher fraction than the national average at the time in China.
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Heterogeneity in the introduction and modification of OCP regulations at provincial level and
variation across households (in calendar time) in the female fertile life span imply that women cov-
ered at some point by OCP regulations may exhibit great differences in the degree to which their
life-time fertility was de facto subjected to OCP fertility restrictions. OCP treatment, in short, is
far from dichotomous in nature (complete vs. no coverage) but may assume different intensities.
Modeling such different intensities of treatment requires a continuous measure of individualized
OCP coverage or treatment. The share of female fertile lifetime subjected to OCP regulations
provides such a measure. Ranging from zero (not restricted at all) to one (complete life-time fer-
tility span restricted), such a life-time-based treatment definition is also more in line with Becker’s
original formulation of the quantity-quality model, where children are considered a durable con-
sumption and production good, and households are to make life-time decisions (or life-time plans)
on reproduction, child quality investments, and own consumption (Becker, 1960). In the literature,
however, dichotomous measures of OCP coverage have been generally used, based, for example, on
whether or not OCP regulations were in force at the particular point in time a woman gave birth
(see discussion above). Such dichotomous measures are clearly inadequate to capture the actual
degree to which female reproductive capacity was constrained by OCP family planning policies.
A potential concern regarding identification is that households may systematically observe OCP
fertility restrictions in the breach, depending on household income. In particular, if richer house-
holds care more about the quantity of children, but less about their quality, and self-select, based
on their income, into having a second child in which they invest less, then any association in the
data between OCP induced changes in quantity of offspring is not fully exogenous, and responses
in educational outcomes to such changes will not capture the true causal effect of variations in the
quantity of children on their quality. There are several reasons, however, why such a scenario is
unlikely to be a major concern in the setting we investigate. First, financial fines for breaches of the
OCP were very substantial, if not prohibitive. Ebenstein (2010), for instance, cites a table of mon-
etary punishments for excess fertility in China from 1979 to 2000 from Scharping (2003), showing
that monetary punishment ranges up to 500% percent of annual salary. Second, households violat-
ing OCP fertility restrictions were routinely subjected to various forms of discrimination by public
authorities. For instance, 1996 population and family planning regulations in Shandong decreed
that employees with unsanctioned births do not get paid during maternity leave, forego the chance
to be promoted or rewarded for five years, and even could face demotion or dismissal. Last but not
least, and using data from the Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) for the year 2000, we
regressed the total number of children a woman has on annual household wage and other type of
income13, controlling also for province and mother age fixed effects. The results of this regression
test show no significant positive effect of household income on child quantity. The same finding
emerges if we consider urban and rural area separately, or restrict the sample to households with
women born in 1958-1979, i.e. to women who could fully be subjected to OCP regulations during
13Non-wage income includes, amongst others, asset rental income, welfare income, and transfers from parents.
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their prime fertility years.14 Furthermore, in our later analysis, we will consider only households
with an agricultural Hukou. Income differences across this more homogenous group of households
are more limited in magnitude.
3.2 Household Census Data
The second type of data we use is a 0.95‰ random sample of households surveyed in the 5th
Chinese Census in the year 2000, provided by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. Several
features of the 2000 census are advantageous, if not vital, for an analysis of the quantity-quality
trade-off in China. First, the census contains information on an individual’s schooling level, from
which we can extract information on the post-compulsory educational choices of children. Second,
the census contains information on households from 31 provinces in China, rather than only a
subset of (possibly selective) regions, as considered in parts of the literature (Qian, 2009; Liu,
2014). This allows us to consider the whole of China in the analysis and to exploit more fully
the great heterogeneity and variation in OCP regulations across time, provinces, nationalities, and
household types. Third, the census provides information on the total number of children a woman
has born and raised irrespective of whether these children still reside at the parental home on
the census day (i.e. a measure of total child quantity, rather than an undercount that is possibly
selective). Finally, the census records the nationality of each person (not only whether a person is
Han or not), which permits us to consider specific exemptions from the OCP that apply only to
particular minorities in the construction of our key policy variable, the intensity of exposure of a
woman during her fertile years to the fertility restrictions of the OCP. We use both the census data
and the data we compiled on OCP regulations and exemptions to construct this policy variable.
The dependent variable and all explanatory variables in our analysis are also constructed from the
census data. In the following, we consider each of these in turn. We begin with our three key
variables, the quality of children, the quantity of children, and our IV, i.e. our key policy variable.
Quality of children (dependent variable): We measure child quality by a dichotomous
variable that takes value one if a child has completed (or is currently enrolled in) post-compulsory
education on the census day, and zero otherwise. Compulsory schooling in China includes primary
school and junior secondary school education, which together amount to nine years of schooling.
As children attend primary school from age six, children complete compulsory schooling at age
15.15 After compulsory education, children may continue with senior secondary school education
or other forms of post-compulsory schooling. Post-compulsory schooling choices are subject only to
parental discretion, that is, a parental choice variable unfettered by public schooling laws. As such,
they are better suited to proxy parental child quality investment than coarser measures, such as
total years of schooling or school enrollment, which consists mostly of compulsory schooling, that
have been used in parts of the literature on China (Qian, 2009). Given our child quality measure,
14Estimation results are available from the author upon request.
15The 1986 Compulsory Education Law of China decreed that children under 15 who had dropped out of school
must go back to school and continue with their education until they are aged 15 (Fang et al., 2012). Children born
after 1971 are covered by this law.
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the child population of interest consists of children who are aged 15 or older. We hence restrict our
estimation sample to households in which there is at least one child that is aged 15 or older when
surveyed in the 2000 census.
Quantity of children (key explanatory variable): We measure child quantity by the
number of siblings a child has. The number of siblings equals the total number of children a child’s
mother has born and raised less one. There are hence zero siblings in a single-child household, and
a single sibling in a two-children household.
OCP coverage (instrumental variable): The policy variable we use to quantify the intensity
by which female reproductive capacity is restricted by OCP regulations is defined as the share
of prime fertility years of a woman that are subject to OCP regulations. Ranging from zero
(no coverage) to one (complete coverage), this measure of OCP coverage is a function of several
factors: female age in different calendar years, the nationality and household Hukou type of a
woman, and the province a female resides in. Province information is vital, because province of
residence determines when a female was in fact first subjected to OCP regulations, and which kind
of exemptions she could potentially enjoy at certain times throughout the course of the OCP and
her fertile life span. In our baseline specification, we consider the prime fertility age of women to
lie between 21 to 35 years of age. This choice is inspired by several factors. First, women in China
must be at least 20 years old to be able to marry. Second, descriptive explorations for women
aged 49 to 50 in the census year of 2000 (i.e. women born in 1950 or 1951 who have completed
their fertility by the time of the census), reveal that 86.4% of their children were born when these
mothers were aged 21 to 35, and 95.05% were born when they were aged between 21 and 40. The
overwhelming majority of births hence occured when mothers were aged 21 to 35, respectively 21
to 40 (we will consider the latter and broader age span of mothers in one of our robustness checks).
Note that for defining our OCP coverage variable, we make exclusive use of information on females
but not males (their husbands). This restriction is inspired by the possibility that marriages may
be selectively formed to enjoy certain exemptions from OCP regulations by marrying a man that is
eligible for exemptions, e.g. because of his minority status. We also disregard information on the
gender of a first-born child when we model the 1.5-child policy (i.e. a household is exempt from the
OCP if both spouses have an agricultural Hukou and their first child is a girl). The reason for doing
so is again potential endogeneity, now in fertility choices, and possibly also in the determination
of the gender of first-borns (Dyson and Moore, 1983; Banister, 2004; Feldman et al., 2007; Li and
Zheng, 2009).16
Other covariates (potentially affecting fertility and child education): In addition to
our key explanatory variable, the quantity of siblings of a child, we will in part of our analysis
control also for other potential determinants of child quantity and quality. These are: (1) province
16Sex-selective abortions, assisted through new technology for pre-natal sex determination in the 1980s, carry the
risk that gender of offspring is not exogenous (Li and Zheng, 2009). In fact, the prima facie reason for introducing
the 1.5-child policy in China has been to help the family with a first-born girl to get more and sufficient labor for
farm work (Yang, 2009). The 1.5-child policy also reduces the incentive of parents with a preference for sons to abort
first pregnancies of mothers who carry a female child to term.
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fixed effects to account for time-invariant differences across regions in average fertility levels and
educational attainment; (2) sets of indicators for mother and child age to control for aggregate
cohort effects across provinces on parental schooling investment, parental reproductive behavior
and child school attainment; and (3) mothers’ and fathers’ educational attainment (measured again
respectively by indicator variables for post-compulsory school attendance) to control for potential
endowment and preference effects of parental background on parental child quantity and quality
choices.
3.3 Determinants of OCP Coverage and Summary Statistics
This subsection provides information on the frequency distribution of households in our 2000 census
data that have been more, respectively less, subjected to OCP fertility restrictions during the prime
fertility years of mothers. It also considers correlations between different incomplete measurements
of OCP household coverage and a complete encompassing measure of such coverage to gauge the
respective importance of different household characteristics for obtaining a high-quality measure of
actual OCP coverage. Finally, we provide summary statistics for our final estimation sample.
Table 2 tabulates, for all households in the census year 2000 in which mothers are aged 35 to
50, the respective fractions of households (in percent) that have been subjected to OCP restrictions
zero to fifteen years during mothers’ prime fertility years.17
In the literature, two pieces of household information and corresponding exemption clauses
are often used to construct a household policy variable for OCP coverage, household ethnicity (or
nationality) and household Hukou type (or agricultural background) (Qian, 2009; Li et al., 2011;
Liu, 2014). Table 2 considers first each of these dimensions in isolation for defining a measure of
the OCP coverage of households (in columns (2) and (3)) and then compares the two resulting
distributions of OCP coverage intensity across households to the distribution that results when
information on both of these household characteristics and respective OCP exemtptions are con-
sidered (column (4)). In this way, one can gauge the respective importance of each of these two
dimensions for obtaining a suitable measure of the actual OCP coverage of households in empirical
applications. Two major findings emerge from Table 2. First, the distribution in column (3), which
is based only on information on household agricultural Hukou type and exemption regulations for
such type of households, is very close to the coverage distribution in column (4) that results when
one uses “full” household and policy exemption information. The distribution that results when
only information on household ethnicity and corresponding exemptions regulations are considered
(column 2), in contrast, differs quite markedly from the one in column (4). These findings may
come at little surprise, given that 80% of the Chinese population has an agricultural background,
but only 10% is from a minority. Information on the agricultural Hukou status of households, but
not information on their ethnicity, is hence indispensable for constructing a measure of household
OCP coverage that does justice to the actual OCP restrictions faced by the overwhelming majority
17Households in which a child was born before 1965 are dropped to exclude potential adoptees and stepchildren
and avoid other forms of measurement error in the number of children.
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Table 2: Sources of OCP Coverage and Exemptions at Household Level (in %)
Fertile Source of exemption:
years: mother minority mother agricultural complete
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0 2.76 6.58 7.85
1 0.37 2.00 2.18
2 0.79 3.05 3.53
3 0.29 3.39 3.44
4 1.52 6.33 6.25
5 2.38 10.18 9.78
6 3.85 12.14 11.82
7 4.70 10.90 10.61
8 5.34 4.88 4.78
9 5.51 5.42 5.32
10 5.64 3.17 3.12
11 6.00 3.29 3.21
12 5.94 2.75 2.71
13 5.41 2.60 2.56
14 5.14 2.62 2.57
15 44.34 20.70 20.29
100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: The table shows the respective fractions of households (in
percent) that have been subjected to OCP restrictions zero to fif-
teen years (column 1) during mothers’ prime fertility years for all
households in the census year 2000 in which mothers are aged 35
to 50 and no child is older than 35. Columns (2) and (3) construct
measures of OCP coverage of households using only ethnicity in-
formation, respectively agricultural Hukou information. Column
(4) provides an encompassing measure of OCP coverage that uses
information on both ethnicity and agricultural Hukou.
of the Chinese population. Second, about 44% of households are classified as being covered by OCP
restrictions throughout the entire fifteen years of female prime fertility, when only information on
household ethnicity and corresponding OCP exemptions are considered (see last-but-one entry in
column (2)). This figure is more than twice as large as the corresponding figure for the complete
measure of OCP coverage (column (4)). Taken together, both findings illustrate that severe mis-
measurement or mis-classifications may result when household agricultural Hukou information is
disregarded. In fact, and as shown in Table 3, information on agricultural background and asso-
ciated exemptions suffices to produce a measure of household OCP coverage that is very highly
correlated with an encompassing measure that makes full use of both ethnicity and agricultural
Hukou information.
China has a huge population that is economically and ethnically diverse. As individuals of
different Hukou types and nationalities may behave quite differently, we restrict the estimation
sample to the more homogenous group of Han Chinese (mothers) which have an agricultural Hukou.
This group, which still accounts for the majority of the Chinese population, mainly lives in less
developed areas, where the quantity-quality trade-off (if anything) should be more pronounced.
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Table 3: Correlations between Different OCP Measures at Household Level
mother minority mother agricultural complete
mother minority 1.0000
mother agricultural 0.3026 1.0000
complete 0.3833 0.9701 1.0000
Notes: The table shows correlation coefficients between three measures of OCP
coverage, one that uses only ethnicity information, one that uses only agricul-
tural Hukou information, and one that uses information on both ethnicity and
agricultural Hukou.
Our final estimation sample consists of 67,953 children from 46,814 households. Table 4 provides
summary statistics for this estimation sample.
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Estimation Sample
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
number of siblings 1.6494 0.9945 0 9
enrollment in post-compulsory education 0.1524 0.3594 0 1
OCP 0.4661 0.2238 0 1
mother education (enroll. in post-comp. edu.) 0.0374 0.1897 0 1
father education (enroll. in post-comp. edu.) 0.1181 0.3227 0 1
child age:
15-19 0.6347 0.4815 0 1
20-23 0.2555 0.4362 0 1
24-27 0.0918 0.2888 0 1
28-31 0.0171 0.1298 0 1
32-35 0.0008 0.0284 0 1
mother age:
35-40 0.2355 0.4243 0 1
41-45 0.3848 0.4866 0 1
46-50 0.3797 0.4853 0 1
Total observations 67,953
Notes: The table shows summary statistics for the final estimation sample, which
consists of 67,953 children (observations) for 46,814 households (mothers). The
data are from a 0.95‰ random sample of household census data from the 5th
Chinese census in the year 2000, provided by the National Bureau of Statistics
of China. Child quantity is measured by number of siblings, defined as the to-
tal number of children a mother has minus 1, and child quantity is measured
by enrollment in post-compulsory education, a dummy variable that equals 1
if the child is enrolled or has finished post-compulsory education, and 0 other-
wise. OCP, our policy variable of interest, is defined as the share of years of
female prime fertility that are restricted by OCP regulations. Mother and father
education are measured by indicators for (current or past) enrollment in post-
compulsory education. Children are classified into five age groups (15-19, 20-23,
24-27, 28-31, 32-35), and mothers into three age groups (35-40, 41-45, 46-50).
3.4 Empirical Strategy
To identify the effects that exogenous variations in child quantity induced by OCP fertility restric-
tions had on child quality (as measured by post-compulsory schooling attendance), we estimate
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2SLS regressions of the following type:
Qi = δ0 + δ1Ni + δ2Xi + εi2 (2nd stage)
Ni = θ0 + θ1OCPi + θ2Xi + εi1 (1st stage)
where Qi is the quality of child i, a dichotomous dependent variable for post-compulsory schooling
attendance, Ni is the number of siblings of child i, and Xi is a vector of characteristics of child
i, its parents, and its household. Xi includes a set of dummies for child i’s age, its mother’s
age, and the household’s province, as well as two indicators for parental education, one for post-
compulsory school attendance of the mother, and one for post-compulsory school attendance of
the father. OCPi, our first-stage instrumental variable, measures the degree of OCP coverage of
child i’s household and ranges from zero (no coverage) to one (complete coverage of mother’s prime
fertility years). Finally, εi1 and εi2 are error terms. In our baseline specification, we cluster standard
errors at the level of households since more than one child could be from the same household. In
a robustness check, however, we cluster standard errors also at the level of provinces where family
planning regulations are made. As our dependent variable is dichotomous, we furthermore run IV
probit regressions. As these produce qualitatively identical results, we do not report them in the
main text.18
We expect a household that is longer subjected to OCP fertility restrictions during the prime
fertility years of the mother to have fewer children. In other words, we expect θ1 in the first-stage
regression to be negative. Furthermore, if a child quantity-quality trade-off indeed exists, then
exogenous reductions in child quantity, induced by OCP household coverage, should lead to an
increase in child quality, that is, the likelihood of a child to obtain some post-compulsory schooling
should rise. If so, δ1 in the second-stage regression should be negative.
Identification in our 2SLS setting requires that our instrumental variable OCPi is uncorrelated
with the error term εi2 in the second-stage outcome equation (instrument exogeneity) but cor-
related with the potentially endogenous child quantity measure Ni (instrument relevance). The
former requirement, while not testable, is likely to be satisfied, given the exogeneity (for individ-
ual households) of provincial OCP regulations and exemptions and the fact that we do control
for potential confounders, such as province of residence, mother and child age, as well as parental
education. The second requirement is testable and can be shown to hold. As we will see, when dis-
cussing our regression results in Section 4, OCPi and Ni are indeed highly correlated in our data.
Systematic household migration across provinces can pose a potential threat to identification if
such migration seeks to avoid unfavorable provincial restrictions on household fertility. The actual
scale of cross-province migration in our estimation sample, however, is very low. Using province
information on an individual’s place of current residence (in 2000) and birth shows that 96.49%
of mothers in our estimation sample (accounting for 96.41% of all children under study in our
analysis) still resided in their province of birth in the year 2000. As we will show in a robustness
18Results of IV probit regressions for our baseline specification are provided in the appendix.
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check, dropping households that ever migrated from our estimation sample proves immaterial for
our findings.
4 Results
4.1 Main Results
As we focus in our analysis on households of mothers who are Han with an agricultural Hukou, vari-
ation in the extent of individual OCP coverage in our estimation sample comes from three sources
only, the age of a mother (determining her fertile life span in calendar time), the calendar year that
OCP regulations at province level were first introduced, and the timing and degree of exemptions
from OCP regulations granted at province level to individuals with an agricultural Hukou. Our
main OLS and 2SLS results for different variants of the regression specification described in Section
3.4 are shown in Table 5. Throughout, standard errors are clustered at a household level
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5 report results from simple OLS and 2SLS regressions of child
quantity on child quality, where we consider as additional regressors only the age of a mother and
a set of dummy variables for the different Chinese provinces. Age of mother controls for cohort
effects, such as differences in preferences and in average economic conditions and the differential
exposure of different female cohorts to OCP regulations. Province dummies, in turn, control for
time-invariant differences in child quantity and quality between provinces. The results of this simple
2SLS regression show that the longer a mother’s prime fertility years are subject to OCP fertility
restrictions, the fewer children she tends to have (first stage) and that this exogenous reduction in
child quantity, in turn, is associated with a statistically significant increase in child quality (second
stage), i.e. the likelihood of a child of post-compulsory schooling age to have post-compulsory
education (see column (2) of Table 5). The instrument is strong (large F-statistic) and its negative
coefficient is large: mothers covered by the OCP for their entire fertile years tend to have an average
0.29 children less than they would have got if they had not been subject to any fertility restrictions,
a sizable exogenous reduction in child quantity. Furthermore, the impact of this policy-induced
reduction in family size on child quality is also large. An additional sibling is predicted to reduce
the likelihood of a child to have post-compulsory education by 0.26. Children of mothers covered
by the OCP for their entire fertile years therefore have an average −0.29 × (−0.26) = 0.075 higher
likelihood to have post-compulsory schooling than children of mothers who were never constrained
in their fertility by OCP regulations. This is a sizable increase in child quality given that the
(unconditional) average likelihood of children in our estimation sample to have post-compulsory
education is only 0.15. The OLS results reported in column (1) also show a negative and statistically
significant coefficient estimate of sibling size, albeit one that is much smaller in absolute magnitude.
Based on this estimate, the same decrease in the number of siblings (by 0.29) is predicted to increase
the probability of being enrolled in post-compulsory education by only −0.29 × (−0.04) = 0.012,
which suggests that OLS tends to severely underestimate the true effect of child quantity on quality.
We next add two indicator variables to our set of regressors that take value one if the mother,
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Table 5: OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Number of Siblings on Child Quality
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
1. stage 2. stage 1. stage 2. stage 1. stage 2. stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
number of siblings -0.04*** -0.26*** -0.04*** -0.23*** -0.04*** -0.17***
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.04)
mother education 0.14*** -0.26*** 0.09*** 0.14*** -0.28*** 0.10***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
father education 0.12*** -0.01 0.12*** 0.12*** -0.02 0.12***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
OCP -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.33***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
mother age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
province dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
child age No No No No Yes Yes
F-statistic 55.29 50.75 68.10
observations 67,953 67,953 67,953 67,953 67,953 67,953
Notes: The dependent variable in the OLS and second stage 2SLS regressions is a binary indicator for the enrollment
of a child in post-compulsory education. The dependent variable in the first stage of the 2SLS regression is the number
of siblings of a child. All regressions control for child age in five groups (15-19, 20-23, 24-27, 28-31, 32-35) and mother
age in three groups (35-40, 41-45, 46-50). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard
errors are clustered at the household level and reported in parentheses.
respectively father, has post-compulsory schooling (columns (3) and (4) in Table 5). These binaries
control for parental education and account also for potential differences among parents in prefer-
ences and capabilities that are related to own education and of potential importance for parental
quantity and quality choices, such as the importance parents attach to child education and fertility
and their ability to provide personal support to their children in school. As shown in column (4)
of Table 5, our 2SLS second-stage coefficient estimate for the number of siblings remains negative,
statistically significant, and sizable, although its absolute magnitude (the scale of the trade-off
between quantity and quality) is now marginally smaller. Furthermore, our estimated first-stage
effect of OCP coverage on child quantity is virtually unchanged. Consistent with expectations, more
educated parents tend to have fewer (only mothers) but more educated children (both mothers and
fathers).
Finally, we further augment our specification by adding controls for the age of children. Adding
a set of dummies for different age cohorts controls for potential birth cohort effects in family size
and educational attainment. As shown in column (6) of Table 5, however, controlling for the age
of children does not materially affect our 2SLS estimates. The second stage coefficient estimate for
the number of siblings remains negative and significant (albeit now somewhat further reduced in
magnitude), and our instrument stays strong and of sizable influence for family size.
Summarizing the above, our results suggest that a sizable quantity-quality trade-off existed in
China during the period under investigation, a finding that proves robust to various changes in
model specification. We tried IV probit instead of a linear probability model specification, which
produces qualitatively identical results (see Table A-2 in the appendix).19 Our findings also prove
19As this also holds true for all other 2SLS regressions we estimated and report in the following, we will not tabulate
the results of these IV probit regressions. For the interested reader, they are available from the author upon request.
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robust to the use of alternative ways of clustering standard errors (see Table A-3 in the appendix).
First, we clustered standard errors at the level of provinces at which family planning regulations
were made. With only 31 provinces, the number of clusters is small, which could bias standard
errors and lead to over-rejection (Cameron et al., 2008; Cameron and Miller, 2015). We therefore
use a wild bootstrap test after 2SLS estimation when clustering at province level. The effect of
child quantity in the second stage remains significant, albeit at a lower level (10%), while the
significance of our instrument (OCP) in the first stage remains unchanged. Second, we clustered
standard errors at the level of 91 groups with differential exposure to OCP restrictions, defined by
combinations of mother age (3 age groups) and province of residence (31 provinces).20 For children
whose mothers reside in the same province and are of the same age and Hukou (agricultural) live
in households that are subjected to the same OCP regulations. Reassuringly, clustering standard
errors at this group level also proves immaterial for the statistical significance of our (first-stage)
instrument and (second-stage) measure of child quantity.
4.2 Robustness Checks
We carried out checks on the robustness of our findings to various changes in the estimation sample.
These changes include (i) the restriction of the estimation sample to households with mothers
who still live in their province of birth, (ii) the omission of mothers who are never or completely
constrained by OCP regulations during their prime fertility years, (iii) the restriction of the analysis
to the oldest child living in a family, and (iv) the extension of the estimation sample to children of
mothers who were forty years or older at the time of the 2000 census survey. We also checked the
robustness of our results to (v) the use of an alternative dichotomous child quantity measure that
captures only whether a child does have any other siblings at all. In the following, we discuss each
of the tests in turn.
4.2.1 Excluding Mothers Who No Longer Live in Province of Birth
As discussed in Section 3.4, preference-driven selective endogenous migration of mothers to provinces
less stringent in OCP regulations poses a potential threat to identification in our regression setup.
However, as noted before, only about 3.6% of children in our estimation sample are from a house-
hold with a mother who at the time of the census in the year 2000 resides in a province that differs
from her province of birth. The scale of any preference-driven selective cross-province migration in
our data, if indeed present at all, is hence quite limited at best. Nevertheless, as a robustness check,
we re-estimated our baseline model of column (6) in Table 5, excluding from the estimation sample
those children with mothers who no longer live in their respective province of birth. Compared to
our baseline results, however, the estimated coefficient of the number of siblings remains negative,
statistically significant, and of similar magnitude (see column (2) in Table 6). This finding suggests
20In Tibet, we only have children in our estimation sample whose mothers are in the age group 35-40. Therefore,
we have only 91 groups instead of (31 × 3=) 93 groups.
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that our results do not suffer from potential bias caused by preference-driven selective endogenous
migration of mothers to provinces that are less stringent in their OCP regulations.
Table 6: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Number of Siblings on Child Quality
in Households with Mothers who still Reside in Province of Birth
Baseline No Change in Province of Residence
(1) (2)
2nd stage
number of siblings -0.17*** -0.18***
(0.04) (0.04)
1st stage
OCP -0.33*** -0.32***
(0.04) (0.04)
mother age Yes Yes
province dummy Yes Yes
mother education Yes Yes
father education Yes Yes
child age Yes Yes
F-statistic 68.10 64.84
observations 67,953 65,513
Notes: Column (1) reproduces our baseline results from column (6) in Table 5. Column
(2) reports results from re-estimating our baseline model of column (6) in Table 5 on a
restricted sample of children whose mothers still live in their respective province of birth.
The dependent variable in the second stage of the 2SLS regressions is a binary indicator
for the enrollment of a child in post-compulsory education. The dependent variable in
the first stage of the 2SLS regressions is the number of siblings of a child. All regressions
control for child age in five groups (15-19, 20-23, 24-27, 28-31, 32-35) and mother age
in three groups (35-40, 41-45, 46-50). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%,
5% and 1% level. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in
parentheses.
4.2.2 Excluding Never And/Or Fully OCP-Constrained Mothers
Mothers who are never or fully covered by OCP fertility restrictions during their fertile years may be
different from mothers who are subjected at least partially to such restrictions. In the estimation
sample, about 4.08% of households (accounting for 4.14% of all children) are never covered by
the OCP, while 7.21% of households (housing 5.76% of all children) are fully covered by OCP
fertility restrictions. Our baseline estimation sample, however, includes all mothers, irrespective
of the degree of their exposure to the (treatment of the) OCP. As a consequence, the second-
stage coefficient estimate of child quantity (number of siblings) captures an average effect across all
women that exploits variations in OCP coverage both at the extensive and at the intensive margin.
Mothers who are never or fully covered by OCP fertility restrictions during their fertile years are
not exposed to any variation in policy when fertile. Treatment (full coverage) and no treatment (no
coverage at all) for these mothers are hence exclusively determined by a combination of province
of residence and age, a combination that may have a direct effect on child education, invalidating
our instrument.
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To gauge the relevance of such concerns, we re-estimated our baseline 2SLS specification of
column (6) in Table 5 using three different restricted estimation samples. The first excludes mothers
who were never covered by the OCP during their fertile years, the second excludes mothers who were
completely covered by OCP restrictions during their fertile years, and the third excludes mothers
who were either never or fully covered.21 Table 7 reports estimates from these regressions of our two
key coefficients, the first-stage coefficient on our IV and the second-stage coefficient on our child
quantity measure. As is evident, both are still negatively signed and highly statistically significant.
The first-stage coefficient estimate of our IV turns out even somewhat larger in absolute magnitude
when we drop households that are fully covered by the OCP during mothers’ prime fertility years.
Table 7: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Number of Siblings on Child Quality
in Households Where Mothers Are Not Never And/Or Fully Constrained by the OCP
Baseline OCP∈(0,1] OCP∈[0,1) OCP∈(0,1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2nd stage
number of siblings -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.21***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
1st stage
OCP -0.33*** -0.34*** -0.43*** -0.45***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
mother age Yes Yes Yes Yes
province dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
mother education Yes Yes Yes Yes
father education Yes Yes Yes Yes
child age Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 68.10 73.29 67.26 69.15
observations 67,953 65,139 64,036 61,222
Notes: Column (1) reproduces our baseline results from column (6) in Table 5. Columns
(2) to (4) report results from re-estimating our baseline model of column (6) in Table 5 for
different restricted estimation samples. Column (2) excludes mothers (and their children)
from the estimation sample that are never restricted by the OCP during their prime
fertility years, column (3) excludes mothers that are throughout (fully) restricted during
their years of prime fertility, and column (4) excludes mothers that are either never or
fully restricted by OCP fertility regulations. The dependent variable in the second stage of
the 2SLS regressions is a binary indicator for the enrollment of a child in post-compulsory
education. The dependent variable in the first stage of the 2SLS regressions is the number
of siblings of a child. All regressions control for child age in five groups (15-19, 20-23,
24-27, 28-31, 32-35) and mother age in three groups (35-40, 41-45, 46-50). *, **, ***
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors are clustered at
the household level and reported in parentheses.
4.2.3 The Oldest Child
Our estimation sample considers all children aged 15 or older, irrespective of whether these chil-
dren are first-born children or children of higher birth parity. First-born children, however, are
21The first of these restricted samples of mothers only considers variation in the intensity of OCP coverage across
mothers who are ever covered by the OCP.
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conceptually different from children born at higher parities. The reason is that parents were never
constrained by the OCP in their decision to have a first child, i.e. in their decision to have children
at all. Conditional on having children, OCP regulations only restricted how many children parents
may have. Parents may also treat children of different parity systematically different.
To see whether the undifferentiated use of children of different birth parities matters for our
results, we restricted the estimation sample to the oldest child who is still residing in a household.
Note that this child need not be the first-born child if some child has already moved out. Since
we don’t have any information on children who have moved out by the census year, we cannot
identify the first-born child. Nevertheless, we can use two types of subsamples to explore the
importance of first-born status and, more generally, birth parity for our results. First, we restricted
the estimation sample to those oldest children who live in households where the total number
of children born to a woman is identical to the number of children who still live at home. The
drawback of this approach is that we lose a large number of observations and that mothers in such
households are disproportionately young and hence more likely to be subjected to OCP regulations
during their prime fertility years, reducing the variation in child quantity that is caused by OCP
coverage. Second, since older children are more likely to have moved out of the parental household,
we restricted in a second robustness check the estimation sample further by dropping in addition
the oldest 10% of children. These 10% of children were born before 1976. The oldest children
remaining in this restricted estimation sample are now more likely to be the first-born children.
For each of these two restricted estimation samples, we estimateed the effect that siblings have on
the quality of the oldest child using again our 2SLS baseline specification of column (6) in Table
5.22 Table 8 contains the relevant regression output. The estimated first-stage coefficients of the
policy variable are still negative and significant, but smaller in absolute magnitude than for our
baseline estimation sample. Furthermore, if we compare specifications (1) and (2), the policy effect
is slightly smaller in the second specification, which can be explained by the fact that the likelihood
of households with younger children to be fully covered by the OCP is higher. This is consistent
with the findings in Section 4.2.2. The estimated second-stage coefficient on child quality is again
negative and significant in both specifications.
4.2.4 Prime Fertility Age 21-40 And Mothers Aged 40+
In our baseline specification, the estimation sample covered children of post-compulsory schooling
age (fifteen years or older) of mothers who are aged at least 35 at the time of the 2000 census
and we assumed that women are of prime fertility age between the ages of 21 and 35. In further
robustness checks, we tested whether our findings are sensitive to variation in the minimum age of
mothers considered in the analysis as well as variation in the upper age limit used for defining the
prime fertile age span of women. Both dimensions are of importance for the level of the cutoff age
for completed fertility of women considered in the analysis.
22If there are any twins or triplets among these oldest children, we keep only one of them in the sample (we keep
the child that has the smallest household member number).
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Table 8: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Number of Siblings on Child Quality
for the Oldest Child in a Household
Baseline Restr. Sample I Restr. Sample II
(1) (2) (3)
2nd stage
number of siblings -0.17*** -0.24*** -0.24***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.08)
1st stage
OCP -0.33*** -0.24*** -0.21***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
mother age Yes Yes Yes
province dummy Yes Yes Yes
mother education Yes Yes Yes
father education Yes Yes Yes
child age Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 68.10 55.36 33.86
observations 67,953 46,814 42,145
Notes: Column (1) reproduces our baseline results from column (6) in Table 5. Columns
(2) and (3) report results from re-estimating our baseline model of column (6) in Table 5
for different restricted estimation samples. Column (2) restricts the estimation sample
to the oldest child in a household, and column (3) drops from this restricted estimation
sample the oldest 10% of children. The dependent variable in the second stage of the
2SLS regressions is a binary indicator for the enrollment of a child in post-compulsory
education. The dependent variable in the first stage of the 2SLS regressions is the
number of siblings of a child. All regressions control for child age in five groups (15-19,
20-23, 24-27, 28-31, 32-35) and mother age in three groups (35-40, 41-45, 46-50). *,
**, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors are
clustered at the household level and reported in parentheses.
First, and before changing the definition of prime fertility age, we restricted only the focus to
children of mothers who are aged 40 or older (rather than 35 or older as in our baseline setting),
keeping the 15-year fertility age span as well as our measure of mothers’ OCP coverage intensity
from our baseline specification unchanged. As a result of this sample restriction to older mothers,
total sample size declines from 67,953 to 55,304. Re-estimating our model on this smaller restricted
sample produces an estimated effect of OCP coverage on the number of siblings that is still negative
but much larger in absolute magnitude than that in our baseline results reported in column (6) of
Table 5 (see column (2) in Table 9). A potential explanation for this sizable increase is that women
in the restricted estimation sample (now mothers aged 40+) are less covered by the OCP because of
their average older age so that they could realize a second birth when desiring multiple children. The
second-stage result still indicates a sizeable trade-off between number of siblings and the likelihood
of a child to be enrolled in (or have completed) post-compulsory education. The likelihood of having
post-compulsory education increases by −0.71× (−0.10) = 0.071 percentage points if OCP coverage
intensity of a mother changes from 0 (no coverage) to 1 (complete coverage). The share of children
in the estimation sample that are enrolled in (or have completed) post-compulsory education is
only 0.162.
Second, and in addition to considering only women aged at least 40 at the time of the 2000 census
(as in column (2) of Table 9), we also expanded from 15 to 20 years the maximum number of years
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we consider for defining the prime fertile age span of mothers, adjusting in line with this change
also our measure of mothers’ OCP coverage intensity. This measure remains bounded between zero
and one, but its value for a particular woman may now be different, as we expanded the number
of years in which women are considered fertile. Re-estimating our baseline 2SLS specification of
column (6) in Table 5 using both the older sub-group of mothers and the longer fertile life span
definition produces results that are qualitatively identical to our baseline results (see column (3) in
Table 9). The estimated first-stage coefficient on our IV and the estimated second-stage coefficient
on our child quantity measure are both still negatively signed and highly statistically significant. As
in column (2) of Table 9, the first-stage coefficient estimate of our IV turns out considerably larger
in absolute magnitude than in our baseline specification. The estimated second-stage coefficient of
number of siblings, however, is again very close in value to our baseline estimate.
Table 9: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Number of Siblings on Child Quality
for Mothers Aged 40+ and Prime Fertility Age 21-40
Baseline Mothers Aged 40+ Mothers Aged 40+ / Fertile Age 21-40
(1) (2) (3)
2nd stage
number of siblings -0.17*** -0.10*** -0.16***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
1st stage
OCP -0.33*** -0.71*** -0.72***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.09)
mother age Yes Yes Yes
province dummy Yes Yes Yes
mother education Yes Yes Yes
father education Yes Yes Yes
child age Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 68.10 116.13 67.17
observations 67,953 55,304 55,304
Notes: Column (1) reproduces our baseline results from column (6) in Table 5. Columns (2) and (3) report
results from re-estimating our baseline model of column (6) in Table 5 for different groups of mothers and different
definitions of the prime fertile age span of mothers. Column (2) considers children of mothers who are aged 40
or older (rather than 35 or older as in our baseline setting), keeping the 15-year fertility age span as well as our
measure of mothers’ OCP coverage intensity from our baseline specification unchanged. Column (3), in addition,
expands from 15 to 20 years the maximum number of years we consider for defining the prime fertile age span of
mothers, adjusting in line with this change also our measure of mothers’ OCP coverage intensity. The dependent
variable in the second stage of the 2SLS regressions is a binary indicator for the enrollment of a child in post-
compulsory education. The dependent variable in the first stage of the 2SLS regressions is the number of siblings
of a child. All regressions control for child age in five groups (15-19, 20-23, 24-27, 28-31, 32-35) and mother age in
three groups (35-40, 41-45, 46-50). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard
errors are clustered at the household level and reported in parentheses.
4.2.5 Binary Siblings Indicator
In a final test, we checked the robustness of our results to the use of an alternative and dichotomous
child quantity measure that captures only whether a given child does have any siblings at all. This
binary child quantity variable takes value 1 if a child has any siblings at all, and 0 otherwise. This
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alternative definition is more in line with the critical threshold set by the OCP between one and
two children. The second-stage coefficient on this endogenous binary regressor hence measures the
marginal effect of having any siblings, rather than the marginal effect of having one more sibling
as in our baseline model.
The results of this robustness test are shown in Table 10. As can be seen, OCP coverage exerts
a statistically significant negative effect on the probability of a child to have any siblings at all:
mothers covered by the OCP for their entire fertile years have a 0.12 lower likelihood of having
multiple children than they would have got if they had not been subject to any fertility restrictions.
Moreover, this policy-induced reduction in the likelihood of a second birth tends to increase average
child quality: having siblings is predicted to reduce the likelihood of a child to have post-compulsory
education by 0.47. Children of mothers covered by the OCP for their entire fertile years therefore
have an average −0.12× (−0.47) = 0.0564 higher likelihood to have post-compulsory schooling than
children of mothers who are never constrained in their fertility by OCP regulations. Given that the
(unconditional) average likelihood of children in our estimation sample to have post-compulsory
education is only 0.15, this is a sizable increase in child quality.23
Table 10: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Having Any Siblings on Child Quality
Baseline Binary Siblings Indicator
(1) (2)
2nd stage
siblings (number or binary) -0.17*** -0.47***
(0.04) (0.10)
1st stage
OCP -0.33*** -0.12***
(0.04) (0.01)
mother age Yes Yes
province dummy Yes Yes
mother education Yes Yes
father education Yes Yes
child age Yes Yes
F-statistic 68.10 139.27
observations 67,953 67,953
Notes: Column (1) reproduces our baseline results from column (6) in Table 5.
Column (2) uses a dichotomous child quantity measure (instead of the number of
siblings) that takes value 1 if a child has any siblings at all, and 0 otherwise. The
dependent variable in the second stage of the 2SLS regressions is a binary indicator
for the enrollment of a child in post-compulsory education. The dependent variable
in the first stage of the 2SLS regressions is the number of siblings of a child (column
(1)), respectively a binary indicator that takes value 1 if a child has any siblings at
all, and 0 otherwise (column (2)). All regressions control for child age in five groups
(15-19, 20-23, 24-27, 28-31, 32-35) and mother age in three groups (35-40, 41-45,
46-50). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard
errors are clustered at the household level and reported in parentheses.
23Considering only mothers aged at least 40 at the time of the 2000 census and assuming women are fertile until
this age, as done in Section 4.2.4, produces qualitatively identical results.
25
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated empirically for China the potential trade-off between child quantity
and quality, a trade-off first suggested in 1960 by later Nobel Laureate Gary S. Becker. For
identification, we exploited China’s One-Child Policy (OCP) as an exogenous source of variation in
the number of offspring to a woman. Our results show strong evidence for a sizable child quantity-
quality trade-off among children of Han mothers with an agricultural background, a population
which accounts for about three quarters of all children born in China. This finding proves robust to
various changes in the estimation sample, the use of an alternative and dichotomous child quantity
measure, and the level at which we cluster standard errors.
In our analysis, we have used a novel and more accurate measure of individual OCP coverage
than hitherto the case in the literature. This measure draws on and combines for the first time
detailed regional information on actual OCP implementation, regulations, and exemptions in 31
Chinese provinces, which we collected from provincial family planning regulations, with information
on the actual childbearing age of women at particular points in time and their ethnic and agricul-
tural background. Not dichotomous as in existing studies, this continuous measure captures more
accurately the intensity of treatment individual women have been exposed to by OCP regulations
that restricted their childbearing decisions over the course of their lifetime span of fertility. Other
than in parts of the literature for China, we also restricted the analysis to educational outcomes
of children of post-compulsory schooling age only, i.e. to educational outcomes which are indeed
subject to parental discretion.
The new measure of individual OCP coverage developed in this paper and used in our analyses
can be fruitfully employed in other applications in future research, e.g. for studying tilted sex
ratios at birth, marriage market dynamics and patterns, or criminal activity in China. As data
availability may be more limited in other applications, we gauged in additional explorations, as a
point of reference and service to other researchers, the relative importance of ethnic background
information or household Hukou for obtaining a measure of OCP coverage that is highly correlated
with the measure of OCP coverage which makes full use of all relevant information.
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Table A-2: IV Probit Estimates of the Effect of Number of Siblings on Child Quality
1 2 3
coefficient marg. effect coefficient marg. effect coefficient marg. effect
2nd stage
number of siblings -0.90*** -0.28*** -0.87*** -0.27*** -0.76*** -0.25***
(0.08) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02)
mother education 0.15** 0.05* 0.21*** 0.07***
(0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03)
father education 0.35*** 0.12*** 0.38*** 0.13***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
1st stage
OCP -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.33***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
mother education -0.26*** -0.28***
(0.02) (0.02)
father education -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
mother age Yes Yes Yes
province dummy Yes Yes Yes
child age No No Yes
observations 67,951 67,951 67,951
Notes: The dependent variable in the second stage of the IV Probit regressions is a binary indicator
for the enrollment of a child in post-compulsory education. The dependent variable in the first stage
of the IV Probit regressions is the number of siblings of a child. All regressions control for child age in
five groups (15-19, 20-23, 24-27, 28-31, 32-35) and mother age in three groups (35-40, 41-45, 46-50). *,
**, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors are clustered at the
household level and reported in parentheses.
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Table A-3: 2SLS & IV Probit Estimates of the Effect of Number of Siblings on Child Quality
When Clustering Standard Errors at Province or Group Level
Province Level Group Level
2SLS IVprobit 2SLS IVprobit
2nd stage
number of siblings -0.17**  -0.25*** -0.17*** -0.25***
(0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
1st stage
OCP -0.33***    -0.33***
(0.06) (0.07)
mother age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
province dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
mother education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
father education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
child age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(quasi-)F-statistic 26.08 26.08 20.11
observations 67,953 67,953 67,951 67,953 67,951
Notes: The dependent variable in the second stage of the 2SLS and IV Pro-
bit regressions is a binary indicator for the enrollment of a child in post-
compulsory education. The dependent variable in the first stage of the 2SLS
and IV Probit regressions is the number of siblings of a child. All regres-
sions control for child age in five groups (15-19, 20-23, 24-27, 28-31, 32-35)
and mother age in three groups (35-40, 41-45, 46-50). Standard errors are
clustered at province or group level and reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. , ,    show
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level in a wild bootstrap test after
2SLS estimation when standard errors are clustered at province level.
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